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Obscene Division
Feminist Liberal Assessments of Prostitution
Versus Feminist Liberal Defenses of Pornography
Jessica Spector
;
introduction: feminism, liberalism, and
the sex industry 1
A review of the academic literature on both prostitution and pornogra-
phy reveals a striking difference: while pornography has become a pop-
ular topic in the academy, there is still comparatively little written about
prostitution per se. In philosophical circles, prostitution and pornography
are thought to raise different sets of questions: pornography is discussed
in the context of free speech issues and postmodern thought about subjec-
tivity, while prostitution is typically only discussed (if at all) in the context
of paternalism and gender oppression.
Historically, this has much to do with the development of classical lib-
eral interest in speech issues and traditionally feminist interest in concerns
about women’s labor, set against a back-drop of changes in technology
and the legal concept of obscenity.2 But bound up with the differing legal,
1. I am grateful to Scott Anderson, Anne Eaton, Mark Gutzmer, Martha Nuss-
baum, and Debra Satz for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
2. “Obscene. Objectionable or offensive to accepted standards of decency. Ba-
sic guidelines for trier of fact in determining whether a work which depicts or
describes sexual conduct is obscene is whether the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
419
P1: FAW/SPH P2: FAW
SUPS010-18 SUPS010-Spector SUPS010-Spector-v1.cls April 7, 2006 18:25
420 Chapter Eighteen
social, and academic histories of prostitution and pornography,3 there is
a philosophical problem concerning the justification for their continuing
different treatment, particularly by feminist liberals interested in women’s
sexual liberation and empowerment. Facing the different theoretical treat-
ment of the two activities, and confronting the realities of the lives of those
involved in them, we should wonder whether it makes sense to continue
to compartmentalize real-person pornography as a speech issue relating
to questions of obscenity, separate from discussions of the acts involved
in prostitution.
The goal of this article is to tackle head-on the problem of the disparity
between many feminist liberal assessments of prostitution and a frequent
feminist liberal defense of live-actor pornography, and to suggest a remedy
for it. The aim is both theoretical and practical: to understand and address
some weaknesses in a common strain of many feminist liberal defenses
of (certain aspects of) the sex industry, and to make some suggestions
about how feminist liberalism might better address the conditions of the
lives of the least well-off women. The theoretical points are made in the
service of the ultimately practical end. For in order to improve the lives
of a category of women typically left out of feminist liberal analysis, that
analysis needs a change in focus and in tools.
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, 6th ed. (St. Paul: West Group),
p. 1076. In addition to being a definitive source for Anglo-American legal terminol-
ogy and phrasing, Black’s is sometimes itself cited as legal authority. [Originally
published as Dictionary of Law, Containing Definitions of Terms and Phrases
of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern, 1891, by Henry
Campbell Black (1st edition).]
See also the Model Penal Code article on obscenity, which covers commercial
material only: “Material is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest, in nudity,
sex or excretion, and if in addition it goes substantially beyond customary limits
of candor in describing or representing such matters.” American Law Institute,
Model Penal Code §251.4(1).Commentaries published 1980.
3. Despite its close connection to legally legitimate parts of the sex industry,
prostitution remains illegal everywhere in the United States, except certain coun-
ties in Nevada. A popular misconception is that prostitution is legal in Las Vegas.
In fact, it is illegal in all Nevada counties over a certain population; and street-
walking is illegal everywhere in the State. Currently, brothels are the only legal
form of prostitution in Nevada, and they are legal only in ten out of Nevada’s
seventeen counties. For an account of working conditions inside Nevada’s legal
brothels, see Alexa Albert, 2001, Brothel: Mustang Ranch and Its Women (New
York: Random House).
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My argument about how to effect this change has two parts. The first
concerns the degree to which the disparity between many feminist lib-
eral treatments of prostitution and defenses of pornography are based on
differing conceptions of freedom and the self, and the role that sex and
sexuality play in those conceptions. The second part of my argument con-
cerns the contrast I identify between the respective focus on worker and
on consumer in many feminist defenses of the legal legitimacy of pros-
titution and live-actor pornography. I make the case that even though
feminist liberal defenses of pornography tend to offer more satisfying ac-
counts of the self as socially “situated” than do feminist liberal treatments
of prostitution, they do so while ignoring the very worker who is sup-
posed to be of such primary concern to the feminist liberal in the case of
prostitution.
There are three central debates in the academic literature on prostitu-
tion and pornography: (1) the issue of harm and the possibility of consent
(2) the question of prohibition, and (3) the liberating value versus oppres-
sive function of the practices. In what follows, I argue that these debates
are not (as many would have it) simply about sexual mores, but are more
fundamentally disagreements about the relation between individual au-
tonomy and society, as well as varying conceptions of the good life, and
involve different perspectives on whose interests are relevant for discus-
sion. I begin, in the first half of the paper, by sketching the outlines of the
feminist debates about harms caused by the sex industry (See “The Ques-
tion of Harm and the Possibility of Consent”). Then I deal with the
individualism at the heart of the feminist liberal defense of the legitimacy
of prostitution (See “Liberal Individualism”), and discuss the more
Aristotelian approach feminist liberalism tends to take in its defense of
pornography (See “Human Flourishing and the Value of Expressive
Liberty”). In the second half of the paper, I suggest a change in approach
to both topics, combining an interest in the person whose body is needed
for the production of live-actor pornography with attention to the social
nature of self and its implications for appeals to individual consent (See
“Somebody Somewhere”).
This analysis has the potential to change the landscape of current
thought not only about the sex industry, but also about the self and bod-
ily commodification more generally, making room for a view that is both
more complex and more practical, that looks at the context and harm
of certain sorts of voluntary acts for the participants. As long as we are
unclear about what, or who, is relevant to a discussion of commercial sex,
there is little hope that we can be clear and consistent about other areas
of bodily commodification where the sale of certain kinds of bodily ser-
vices or products is considered suspect, such as surrogacy, cloning, stem
cell research, etc. And if we should change our focus in feminist liberal
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investigations of commercial sex from consumer to the person whose
body or labor makes the commercial product possible, then that may
have implications for the realms of bodily commodification that involve
even more complex questions about whose interests are relevant to the
discussion.4 Therefore, we begin with sex.
the question of harm and the possibil ity
of consent
Traditionally, the central issue in academic discussions of the sex indus-
try has been the question of harm and the possibility of consent, and
following upon this, arguments about the merits of prohibition versus
decriminalization or legalization.5 Defenders of the legitimacy of pros-
titution and pornography argue that either nobody is harmed by them,
or that the participants consent to these harms as part of an economic
4. I have in mind here questions about surrogacy versus the sale of eggs and
sperm. But there are many other issues involving reproductive commodification
that also share the same conceptually dicey ground as the issues of prostitution
and pornography.
5. Legalization is distinguished from decriminalization. Advocates for legal-
ization support government regulation of prostitution, whether as a job like any
other or as a special kind of work. For instance, see Martha Nussbaum, 1999,
“‘Whether From Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for Bodily Services.” In Sex
and Social Justice, pp. 276–98 (NY: Oxford). Advocates for decriminalization
support removing criminal penalties for prostitutes, although not always for their
customers or pimps. For an argument for the latter, see Margaret Jane Radin, 1996,
Contested Commodities, pp. 134–36 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Sweden recently instituted such policies. Many advocates for sex worker rights
also support decriminalization rather than legalization because they are skepti-
cal of any government involvement in prostitutes’ lives. For instance, see Norma
Jean Almodovar, Winter 1999, “For Their Own Good: The Results of the Pros-
titution Laws As Enforced By Cops, Politicians, and Judges.” Hastings Women’s
Law Journal 10:1, pp. 113–114; and Pat Califia, 2000, Public Sex: The Culture of
Radical Sex, 2nd ed., pp. 261–68 (San Francisco: Cleis).). Almost anybody who
professes feminist concerns argues for the legal status quo. However, some have
argued that the solution to the problem of harm requires, as a first step, equal
enforcement of the laws that are already on the books. See Julie Lefler, Winter
1999, “Shining the Spotlight on Johns: Moving toward Equal Treatment of Male
Customers and Female Prostitutes.” Hastings Women’s Law Journal 10:1, esp.
pp. 16–35; and Dorchen A. Leidholdt, “The Sexual Exploitation of Women and
Girls: A Violation of Human Rights.” In Drucilla Cornell, ed., 2000, Feminism
and Pornography (Oxford: Oxford), esp. p. 422.
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trade-off that rational adults should be free to make. Opponents of the
two activities argue that they are indeed harmful, and that the kinds of
harms involved are not the kind to which one rationally consents. The
view here is that consent is meaningless or absent in cases where what is
being commodified is a form of abuse.
In the case of prostitution, the harm question primarily concerns both
women who have sex for money as well as women in general. Possible
harm to male prostitutes is typically subsumed under the harm to women,
or dismissed as either not significant enough for attention or nonexistent,
given the different gender dynamics involved in male versus female prosti-
tution.6 The harms to women who engage in prostitution themselves are
thought to be direct: the woman who has sex for money is physically hurt
and socially denigrated. These harms are so great that it is thought that
she cannot reasonably be said to consent to them. She may be forced into
the exchange by a need for money, or coerced by noneconomic means.
MacKinnon calls the idea that women meaningfully submit to such harms
“the myth of consent,”7 arguing that consent is missing in the case of
prostitution because harms like death and physical violence do not have a
legitimate price, let alone the paltry price charged by street prostitutes in
urban America, or the even more paltry amount left to them after pimps
take their cut.8
6. For instance, see Scott Anderson, July 2002, “Prostitution and Sexual Au-
tonomy: Making Sense of the Prohibition of Prostitution,” esp.p. 49, Ethics 112,
pp. 748–780; Carole Pateman, 1988, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford
University Press), ch. 7, esp. pp. 192–94; Dorchen Leidholdt, 1993, “Prostitu-
tion: A Violation of Women’s Human Rights,” Cardoza Women’s Law Journal 1,
pp. 138–39; Catharine MacKinnon, 1993, “Prostitution and Civil Rights,” Michi-
gan Journal of Gender and Law 1, pp. 13–31; and Debra Satz, October 1995,
“Markets in Women’s Sexual Labor,” Ethics 106:1, p. 64. Although MacKinnon
calls the prostitution of women and girls “the paradigm” case, and says: “prosti-
tution is overwhelmingly done to women by men,” she asks us to remember that
men and boys are also prostituted. For sociological examination of the problem
of harm to male prostitutes in particular, see two English studies: Donald J. West
and Buz de Villiers, 1993, Male Prostitution (London: Harrington Park Press);
and Barbara Gibson, 1995, Male Order: Life Stories from Boys Who Sell Sex,
(London: Cassell), esp. pp. 154–72.
7. MacKinnon makes this point in a variety of ways in a variety of places, but
it is centrally the focus of Catharine MacKinnon (April 25, 2000) “Trafficking
and the Myth of Consent,” given as a public lecture at Trinity College, Hartford,
CT.
8. MacKinnon’s point is that, in fact, the consideration (i.e. payment) involved
in the typical prostitution “contract” is too paltry to even be considered legitimate
consideration. This is part of a larger argument she makes about the contract issues
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For critics of prostitution per se (rather than of the poverty that under-
girds the practice), such harms are of a different sort than harms resulting
from other labor. This view is often confused with (and criticized as) a
form of essentialism about a woman’s sexual identity. But it need not be.
Pateman makes the harms case by asking us to consider why there is, in
social fact, a demand for commodified sex with women.9 The prostitute’s
gender is pivotal, according to Pateman, who argues that prostitution is a
“problem about women,” not just a matter of commodified sex, in that it
involves the purchase of a right over a woman’s body. This is important
for Pateman, because it means that prostitution is not simply a type of or-
dinary wage labor. According to her, prostitution is unlike other physical
labor, because it involves the unrestricted right to use a woman’s body,
not for the production of some further end, but for its own sake. As an in-
herently gendered exchange, the prostitution contract is an instantiation
of an over-arching sexual contract that trades patriarchal sexual rights
over women. So, because sex and power are linked in this way, we cannot
treat prostitution as just another form of wage labor.10
This position, often called “radical feminist,” maintains that prostitu-
tion is not merely the fallout of poor economic conditions, but is the ur-
form of women’s oppression.11 A system of gender oppression corrupts
the “free market” and prevents equal exchange between men and women,
particularly regarding anything related to sex.12 According to this view,
in prostitution. Typically, in contract law, what matters is the fact of consideration,
not its adequacy. Inadequate consideration may be taken as evidence of undue
influence, which could void a contract, but it is not an element in a case to rescind.
MacKinnon’s larger argument addresses this.
9. Carole Pateman, April 1983, “Defending Prostitution: Charges Against
Ericsson,” Ethics 93, pp. 561–65, p. 563.
10. Carole Pateman, “What’s wrong with Prostitution?” op. cit.
11. Representatives of the radical feminist position include Margaret Baldwin,
1992, “Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform,”
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 5, pp. 47–120; Kathleen Barry, 1995, The Pros-
titution of Sexuality (New York: New York University Press); Andrea Dworkin,
1997, “Prostitution and Male Supremacy,” in Life and Death (New York: Free
Press), pp. 138–216; Evelina Giobbe, “Prostitution: Buying the Right to Rape,”
in Ann Wolbert Burgess, ed., 1991, Rape and Sexual Assault III (New York:
Garland), pp. 143–60; Catharine MacKinnon, “Prostitution and Civil Rights,”
op. cit.; Christine Overall, Summer 1992, “What’s Wrong with Prostitution?
Evaluating Sex Work,” Signs, pp. 705–24; and Carole Pateman, The Sexual Con-
tract, op. cit.
12. See Kathleen Barry, “The State: Patriarchal Laws & Prostitution,” from
The Prostitution of Sexuality, op. cit., p. 246.
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the problem with arguments aimed simply at the economic coercion in
prostitution is that they draw attention away from the gendered nature
of this sex-power exchange.
Beyond the direct harms to the prostitutes from this sex-power ex-
change, the feminist critic charges that the practice of prostitution harms
women generally.13 If men think they possess a right to purchase do-
minion over a woman’s body, then this cannot but affect the entire so-
cial and economic climate for women.14 Some have even argued that
part of the problem with the focus on consent is that, by misleading
us into thinking that prostitution is the kind of thing one meaning-
fully chooses, it turns prostitution in particular into a problem about
“other women” rather than a problem with gender and power rela-
tions for all women. If a woman chooses a life of prostitution, then
“the rest of us” can distance ourselves from the harms that befall
her. Baldwin charges that abstract academic arguments about prostitu-
tion perpetuate this “us/them, good-woman/whore” dichotomy, turning
the problem of harm into an intellectual one about the conditions for
consent.15
This critique of the meaningfulness of consent (or its sheer absence)
goes to the heart of the feminist liberal view that prostitution can enable
the disadvantaged to gain control of their own labor power. The standard
liberal line on activities that are thought to be disreputable, degrading,
or harmful is that it is up to the participants to decide whether or not
they want to engage in them. So, even though prostitution might be
13. Catharine MacKinnon, “Prostitution and Civil Rights,” op. cit., pp. 30–
31. MacKinnon’s view is that the harms of pornography bring the harms of
prostitution to all women, since “pornography is an arm of prostitution.” For
an early economic argument for how prostitution harms women generally, see
Elizabeth Blackwell, “Preface and Chapter II: The Trade in Women,” Essays in
Medical Sociology pp. 135–41 and 155–74. [Originally in The Human Element
in Sex, London: J.A. Churchill, 1884] (Interestingly, Blackwell happens to have
been the first woman M.D.)
14. In his argument against the normalization of prostitution, Anderson runs
a thought experiment about the bad consequences of treating prostitution as a
legitimate form of work. See Scott Anderson, “Prostitution and Sexual Autonomy:
Making Sense of the Prohibition of Prostitution,” op. cit.
15. Margaret Baldwin, “Split at the Root: Prostitution & Feminist Discourses
of Law Reform,” op. cit. See also Margaret Baldwin, Winter 1999, “‘A Mil-
lion Dollars and An Apology:’ Prostitution and Public benefits Claims,” Hastings
Women’s Law Journal 10:1, pp. 189–224, where Baldwin makes the same gen-
eral point, but without the emphasis on the power of anecdote versus abstract
argument.
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harmful (as are many forms of wage labor), it should be left as a matter
of individual choice.
Many feminist liberals even acknowledge the gendered nature of the
practice of prostitution in their defenses of the possibility of consent,16
holding that prostitution is something women disproportionately do be-
cause our society generally fetishizes women’s sexuality. But this, accord-
ing to the liberal line, does not mean that sexual wage labor must be ille-
gitimate. Indeed, the view goes, if we attend to past puritanical judgments
about the appropriate sphere of women’s labor, we see that prostitution is
much like other traditionally stigmatized occupations for women. What is
really needed, according to this view, is a sustained comparison between
prostitution and other forms of wage labor, to try to identify precisely
what might be troubling about prostitution, or rather, about the way
that it is practiced. Schwarzenbach likens the prostitute as physical la-
borer to a dancer, while Nussbaum compares prostitution to a number
of jobs that skew female, including domestic servant and masseuse, and
Shrage points out the similar way that child care workers and prostitutes
tend to come from disadvantaged socio-economic classes.17 The point of
such analogies is to show that the wage labor involved in prostitution
is not so different from other traditionally women’s wage labor in being
potentially physically damaging and historically seen as degrading. Ac-
cordingly, since we treat other such jobs as legitimate choices, we should
similarly treat prostitution. For feminist liberalism, it is the worst form of
paternalism to preclude the choices of women whose options are already
limited.18
16. The representatives of the feminist liberal position that I focus on in the
following discussion are Laurie Shrage, January 1989, “Should Feminists Oppose
Prostitution,” Ethics 99:2, pp. 347–61; Sibyl Schwarzenbach, 1991, “Contractar-
ians and Feminists Debate Prostitution,” NYU Review of Law and Social Change,
pp. 103–13; and Martha Nussbaum, “‘Whether From Reason or Prejudice’:
Taking Money for Bodily Services,” in Sex and Social Justice op. cit. I focus on
these authors because they offer three very different and compelling arguments
in defense of the legitimacy of prostitution that all maintain the possibility of
consent, while still being sensitive to harms caused by the practice.
17. Sibyl Schwarzenbach, “Contractarians and Feminists Debate Prostitu-
tion,” op. cit., pp 114; Martha Nussbaum, “‘Whether From Reason or Preju-
dice’: Taking Money for Bodily Services,” op. cit., pp. 276–98; and Laurie Shrage,
“Should Feminists Oppose Prostitution,” op. cit., esp. pp. 358–59.
18. I am grateful to Martha Nussbaum for our expanded discussions of these
points. As she has rightly pointed out to me, her ultimate assessment of prosti-
tution is not a romantic one—in fact, she describes the prostitute as more often
P1: FAW/SPH P2: FAW
SUPS010-18 SUPS010-Spector SUPS010-Spector-v1.cls April 7, 2006 18:25
Obscene Division 427
liberal individualism
So the radical feminist critique of prostitution is both an argument about
the harms caused by prostitution and an argument about the fact (or some-
times, about the possibility) of consent to such harms, while the feminist
liberal defense of the legitimacy of prostitution is an argument that the
harms are not of a different kind than the harms caused by other jobs and,
as such, can be subject to meaningful consent. This is not a disagreement
to be resolved here (if anywhere). But it is one that reveals a deeper dis-
agreement not only about the status of women, but also about the social
elements of personhood and the conditions necessary for freedom. The
radical and the liberal may agree about the pervasive nature of women’s
sexual oppression, and even about the generally deplorable conditions
of the lives of many prostitutes, but they disagree fundamentally about
the influence such oppression must have on the possibility of the self’s
integrity and the power of choice.
This is partly because the two views tend to differ concerning what con-
stitutes free choice. The radical feminist sees the prostitute who appears
to “consent” to prostitution as so affected by systematic gender oppres-
sion that her choices are distorted—and even her sense of self shaped—by
it. Whereas the liberal believes in the individual’s ability to transcend
her oppressive circumstances somewhat by making a rational decision to
do the best she can, considering. And to choose to do the best one can,
considering, is to be free. The choices one has might be limited, and the
circumstances one finds oneself in might be terrible, but one still can act
as a rational agent, deliberating over options and choosing a course of
action. Recently, Martha Nussbaum has critiqued what she terms this
Kantian view of the individual moral agent, explicitly advocating a more
Aristotelian conception of the self. But this is in the context of a critique
of the Kantian-Rawlsian view of the family, not in the context of her dis-
cussion of prostitution. This is important, for I am about to argue that
liberal feminist treatments of prostitution and pornography (including
Nussbaum’s) tend to employ different models of the self: Lockean in one
case, and more Aristotelian in the other.19
According to Locke, the capacity for self-determination rests upon a
proper prudential concern for oneself and the ability to rationally choose
akin to the capitalist wage slave than the creative artist. One of her points is that
what feminism needs to do is discuss the conditions of the wage slave generally.
19. See Martha Nussbaum, 2000, “The Future of Feminist Liberalism,” Pro-
ceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74, pp. 49–79.
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actions that further one’s own good.20 This Enlightenment conception of
freedom as self directed (autonomous), prudential rational action is im-
plicit in the liberal defense of the prostitute’s ability to choose to sell sex
and meaningfully consent to what may be degrading or dangerous work
conditions. Liberals need not defend the form most prostitution takes (in
the United States or elsewhere) in order to think that consent can still be
meaningful. What is important to the liberal is that the individual surveys
options, and reasons practically about which course of action will further
her own ends. The feminist liberal may admit that a person’s social con-
text and relations are important, but it is still ultimately the individual
person, or self, and her rational choices that are key here, rather than
the good for a group of people, or a conception of human flourishing.
That is why the feminist liberal defender of the legitimacy of prostitution
focuses so heavily on the harms caused by the stigma surrounding prosti-
tution. The social stigma oppresses the individual, preventing the exercise,
without suffering social repercussions, of will concerning the use of one’s
own body. The stigma thus prevents the individual from expressing and
exploring her own choices.
This view of the person, or self, as a discrete individual whose choices
and actions come from within and can be analyzed somewhat indepen-
dently of social practice, has of course been criticized from the Enlighten-
ment onward. Much feminist liberal discussion of prostitution is sensitive
to this and concerned with the problem of how to ensure that the indi-
vidual’s choices really are free and that a life of prostitution is truly a
viable one. But despite a sensitivity to the influence on the self of social
practices and context—typically expressed as a recognition of the con-
straining power of social stigma—feminist defenses of prostitutes’ free
choice to engage in the sex trade still tend to be based on a foundation
of liberal individualism.21 This is not only something that many feminist
20. A person who has the capacity to rationally reflect, deliberate, and adopt
a course of action is self-determined. Without the capacity for self-determination,
the agent cannot bind herself to an authorized course of action, so cannot be
obligated or capable of law. See John Locke, 1975, An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press) esp. p. 2.21
“Of Power,” pp. 233–87.
21. For instance, compare Martha Nussbaum’s (2000) critique of adaptive
preferences and list of human capabilities as central political goals in Women
and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press) with her discussion of prostitution in particular in “‘Whether
From Reason or Prejudice’: Taking Money for Bodily Services,” op. cit. As men-
tioned above, Nussbaum explicitly critiques the Kantian-Rawlsian conception of
the isolated individual self. But that critique makes no mention of the case of
P1: FAW/SPH P2: FAW
SUPS010-18 SUPS010-Spector SUPS010-Spector-v1.cls April 7, 2006 18:25
Obscene Division 429
liberals admit, but also something they are proud of: championing the
rights and interests of the individuals who work in prostitution in order
to secure for these individuals the same choices and economic opportuni-
ties as other individuals.
A main point of disagreement between the radical feminist critics of
prostitution and feminist liberal defenders of its legitimacy is over this
issue of an individual’s ability and right to choose a type of life that may
not generally be considered a good one. Feminist liberals worry that sexual
conservatism lies at the core of the social stigma surrounding prostitution,
and are concerned that the feminist critics of prostitution play into the
sexual conservatives’ hands by limiting the type of sexual expression open
to women. They argue that individuals with sexual desires and preferences
outside of the romanticized norm are marginalized and their identities
reduced to their sexual activities. Shrage and Schwarzenbach both claim
that this tendency to identify persons with their sexual activities (e.g.
slut, prude, lesbian, etc.) contributes to the stigmatization of women who
exchange sex for money.22 But their suggested solution is not to give up
the idea of a “true self;” rather, their suggested solution is to recognize
that one’s sexual activities do not in fact constitute that “true self.” One
has a body, with which one engages in sexual activity, but the self, or
person, is not that body or those activities, whether those activities are
thought to liberate or constrain.
Notice here that for many feminist liberals, the entire discussion of
prostitution rests on questions about the agency of the individual prosti-
tute. Whether the issue is economic coercion, sexual expression, or dif-
fering notions of the good life, feminist liberalism focuses on the woman
who is exchanging sex for money, and on the conditions of her labor. Her
agency is typically thought to be isolable and separately analyzable—even
while social stigma is recognized as a powerful influence—and the discus-
sion is phrased in the terms of her options and choices, constrained though
they might be. Yet this is not the case when it comes to pornography. As
we shall see, this disparate treatment of prostitution and pornography
reveals a tension in the feminist liberal view between an individualis-
tic perspective and a more socially constructed view of agency—a ten-
sion coincident with a shift in focus from worker to consumer, and from
prostitution and, I maintain, her explicit defense of prostitution seems to involve
a more Lockean than Aristotelian conception of the self.
22. Both Schwarzenbach and Shrage discuss the “reification” of one’s sexual
identity. See Schwarzenbach, “Contractarians and Feminists Debate Prostitution,”
op. cit., p. 117; and Shrage, “Should Feminists Oppose Prostitution,” op. cit., esp.
p. 356.
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concern with the conditions of labor to concern with the liberty interests
associated with speech.
human flourishing and the value of
express ive liberty
While the radical feminist concern in the case of live-actor pornography
remains both the woman who is exchanging sex for money (whether
directly or indirectly), and the condition of women generally, the feminist
liberal focus shifts away from the individual worker and the conditions
of her labor, to the consumer and the consumer’s relation to the product
of pornography. In the case of pornography, the traditional or classical
liberal (in some degree of contrast with the feminist liberal) tells us that
we need not watch it, read it, or listen to it if we do not like it. As rational
adults, we make our own choices about the private activities in which we
wish to engage, and any attempt to curtail those choices impinges on our
freedom. According to the classical liberal, much pornography may be
disturbing, but we can, at the least, turn away from it and, at the most,
make our views heard in the free public realm so that we can convince
others that it is disturbing and that they should turn away from it too.
This view has often been criticized by feminists of all stripes for pred-
icating too much on a distinction between a private realm of free choice
and a public one of free debate. As many have argued, this distinction
between a private realm and a public one is problematic because it it-
self reinforces the gender hierarchy that is at issue.23 The “private” is
typically construed as the realm of the personal and the intimate. But if
the worry is that the personal and the intimate are implicated in and af-
fected by pornography in harmful ways, then it does no good to close off
discussion of those harms through appeals to privacy.
However, the problem with privacy appeals is even more fundamental
than this point about the gendered nature of “the private.” The concept
itself is too loose to form the basis of any solid defense of the liberal
position. The classical liberal view is concerned with protecting privacy
without being clear about the sense of private. If “private” means anything
that is not the law’s business, then it is circular to argue that the law should
steer clear of the private realm. If “private” means what happens at home
or what is not exposed to view, then further argument is required to show
23. For a sustained argument of this sort, see especially Susan Moller Okin,
1989, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books).
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that the law should stay out of it. Because of the looseness of the concept
of “privacy,” simply appealing to privacy is inadequate as a defense of
the liberal position.
Yet, as problematic as the privacy defense is, it at least is meant to be
broad enough to defend the legitimacy of both prostitution and pornogra-
phy. It is when the more sophisticated feminist liberal accounts attempt to
defend the legitimacy of pornography, including live-actor pornography,
by means other than the privacy appeal that their approach to the two ac-
tivities splits apart, shifting from an Enlightenment model of personhood
and agency—with its emphasis on individual autonomy and rationality—
to a view of the self as more socially embedded and fluid.
Many feminist liberals recognize the problems with the privacy appeal
and seek to defend pornography’s legitimacy by other means, as a form of
expression representative of ideas rather than defending it as a legitimate
type of bodily commodification. Instead of arguing that the sexual sphere
of rational adults should be off limits to the law, people like Sally Tisdale
argue that pornography’s value is in what it teaches us about ourselves.24
The “us” here is of course the viewer. Tisdale, for instance, is careful
to note that (live-actor) pornography may have harmful effects on male
viewers’ attitudes about women, but she thinks this is balanced by the
educational benefits it has for women like her.25 The view is that pornog-
raphy is fantasy, and as such, it comes wholly from within.26 So, rather
than being harmful to women, pornography can be liberating, enabling
women to control their own sexuality.
This sort of defense often employs a legal model of obscenity to inter-
pret pornography, treating the live-actor pornography product as a repre-
sentation of ideas in the same way as a work of fiction.27 For the liberal
24. Sallie Tisdale, 1989, “Talk Dirty to Me,” in Alan Soble, ed., The Philosophy
of Sex (New York: Rowman and Littlefield), p. 278.
25. Sallie Tisdale, “Talk Dirty to Me,” op. cit., p. 276.
26. Sallie Tisdale, “Talk Dirty to Me,” op. cit., p. 273. For a similar argument
about the importance of pornography’s being fantasy, but a very different con-
clusion about the significance of such fantasy, see Beverley Brown, “A Feminist
Interest in Pornography—Some Modest Proposals” in m/f , 5/6 London: 1981.
pp. 5–18.
27. Most of this discussion is focused on US obscenity law. The US Supreme
Court has ruled that First Amendment protections of free speech and expression
do not cover obscenity. This sense of ‘obscenity’ always refers to sex, and is
defined by the Miller test, based on the 1973 Supreme Court ruling in Miller
versus California that held that, in determining whether speech or expression
could be labeled obscene, courts must consider all of three criteria:
P1: FAW/SPH P2: FAW
SUPS010-18 SUPS010-Spector SUPS010-Spector-v1.cls April 7, 2006 18:25
432 Chapter Eighteen
defender of pornography’s legitimacy, the difference between textual or
virtual pornography and pornography that uses real, live human bodies is
not significant. Even pornography that shows real people having real sex
is considered to be part of the realm of ideas and fantasy. Thus, live-actor
pornography is assimilated to speech with the additional defense that our
sexual identities are partially formed by exposure to breadth and variety
in such speech. Whether or not real people are laboring to produce the
product is beside the point: what matters is the consumer’s relation to the
product of that labor.
Such a view of the value of pornography as sexual expression is com-
pelling. If women’s sexuality is constrained in a male-dominated culture,
then it seems liberating to reclaim that sexuality and acknowledge one’s
own sexual identity. On this view, pornography can help “us” do that by
showing us the good, the bad, and the ugly in our culture’s sexual tropes
and stereotypes. After all, knowledge is power, and the more we know
about what arouses us and what does not, the more we can own and
control our own sexual identities.
Joshua Cohen offers a more intellectual version of this argument, re-
sponding to the call for legal restrictions on live-actor pornography, by
trying to make some space for societal interests in protecting pornogra-
phy.28 Cohen argues that the harm pornography does can be combated in
a way that preserves sexual expression. He suggests treating some pornog-
raphy as a subcategory of obscenity,29 thus leaving room for discussions
of its worth in the context of decisions about what might be regulated.30
This is important, according to Cohen, because expression itself is part
of liberty. So live-actor pornography is completely assimilated to speech
(1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(2) whether the work depicts/describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by applicable state law; and
(3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
See Miller versus California 413 US 15 (1973). But see also the British Obscene
Publications Acts (specifically 1959 and 1964) and the Limitations clause of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Clause One).
28. Joshua Cohen, 1996, “Freedom, Equality, Pornography,” in Austin Sarat
and Thomas Kearns, eds., Justice and Injustice in Law and Legal Theory (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 99–137.
29. See reference, above, to Black’s Law Dictionary and Model Penal Code
for definitions of obscenity, under US law.
30. See Joshua Cohen, “Freedom, Equality, Pornography,” op. cit., p. 134.
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and defended as involving distinct liberty interests for its producers and
society at large.
This is the classic argument Mill gives for free speech in general in On
Liberty. There Mill argues that one of the reasons that free speech is so im-
portant is because we need to hear a variety of opinions in order to know
what is true and to hold true beliefs for the right reasons. The great thing
about human judgment, according to Mill, is that it can be corrected—but
only if we have access to a range of views. So free expression, of good or
bad views, is helpful.
But Mill (and Cohen, to some extent) go beyond this argument based
on the value of free expression for us as individuals searching for truth.
Mill, the classical liberal, and some contemporary feminist liberals fol-
lowing him, argue that a free marketplace of ideas enables one to develop
one’s capacities and become a more fully realized person by providing in-
formation to guide choices and explore one’s sense of self. What is needed
for this is not just negative freedom, but a variety of ideas and experiences
to have and choose from. Indeed, for Mill, this is what makes us human;
such “experiments in living” help us figure out the best way of life for
each of us.31 And in a community with others, we learn from their choices
and they learn from ours. In this way, a free society is the best facilitator
of human flourishing.32
For Tisdale, Cohen, and other defenders of the value of pornogra-
phy, the classical liberal defense of free speech, combined with this more
Aristotelian appreciation for the centrality of choice in the formation of
character, takes the form of a defense of the way pornography portrays
varieties of sexual experience—for good and ill. So pornography—even
nasty, hateful pornography—helps one develop a sense of who one is and
who one is not. The value of live-actor pornography then, lies in its role of
offering representations for its consumers to emulate or reject. Because de-
sire is partly socially structured, limiting access to a variety of commercial
pornographic representations can stunt the development of a person’s own
patterns of desire and sexual identification. For this reason, severe restric-
tions on live-actor pornography are not just impractical, but wrong, espe-
cially since it is women (and other oppressed groups, such as homosexuals)
who have historically had such choices and experiences closed off to them.
31. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ch. 3.
32. Mill is at his most Aristotelian here. For a discussion of Mill’s “experiments
in living,” and a comparison of the differences between Mill and Aristotle on the
role of choice in human flourishing, see John Gray, 1991, “Mill’s Conception of
Happiness and the Theory of Individuality,” in J.S. Mill’s On liberty in Focus, ed.,
John Gray and G.W. Smith (New York: Routledge), pp. 190–211.
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Now, of course, the critic of commercial live-actor pornography would
argue that your sexual awakening and development is not worth someone
else’s abuse and subjugation, even if one were to buy the idea that pornog-
raphy facilitates the former (which most critics do not33). Nonetheless,
the thing to notice here is that this liberal defense of the value of pornog-
raphy does not make the self out to be an isolable object, available for
individual analysis, in the way that the liberal treatment of prostitution
does. On the contrary, this liberal defense is predicated on the self’s de-
veloping partly in response to social constraints and experiences. Here
the Lockean conception of a person as an individual standing alone and
deciding to sell her labor power34 has given way to a more Aristotelian
defense of the value of an abundance of choices for a community of fully
functioning moral agents.
This shift is made without much consideration of how such choices
are distributed. And this encapsulates part of the problem with the fem-
inist liberal shift from a discussion of the harms/benefits for the worker,
in the case of prostitution, to a discussion of the value of pornographic
speech for the consumer, even in the case of live-actor pornography. The
worker35—the person whose labor power, or body, is needed for the
33. The most obvious objection to the claim that pornography is valuable as
an aid in sexual awakening is the counter-claim that it is merely a masturbatory
device. I do not wish to enter into a debate over whether or not something can be
both things at once, or even a debate about whether any pornography is indeed
both things at once. But it is important to note that many critics of pornography
would object to all the high-minded talk of “human flourishing” and speech in this
context. (See, for example, Mackinnon’s famous remarks that one can’t argue with
an orgasm and that “an erection is neither a thought nor a feeling, but a behavior.”
Catharine MacKinnon, 1993, Only Words, ch. 1, Cambridge: Harvard).
34. For further discussion of the Lockean conception of ownership in the con-
text of the prostitution exchange, see Sibyl Schwarzenbach, “Contractarians and
Feminists Debate Prostitution,” op. cit., §3. Of course Locke himself may have had
a more nuanced conception of self than the version described. In any event, Hume
certainly did. Nevertheless, it is the indivudualism of the Lockean conception that
has had so much influence on the liberal tradition.
35. The terms ‘work’ (in this context) and ‘sex worker’ are themselves con-
troversial. The term ‘sex work’ is typically credited to Carol Leigh (aka Scarlot
Harlot), who initially introduced it as a way to emphasize the legitimacy of com-
merce in sex and to reclaim some dignity for those who exchange sex for money.
Although the term ‘sex work’ has become increasingly popular in some circles
as a way of referring to those who make money as prostitutes, pornography
actors, strippers, etc., it is still rejected by many. Some see it as a way of white-
washing the abuse suffered by many who are used in the sex industry, and thus
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viewer of live-actor pornography to have the varieties of experience with
different forms of speech that the liberal argues are so important—has
dropped out of the account of the feminist liberal treatment of pornog-
raphy. There are a number of pornography workers who offer defenses
of what they do for money.36 But even consideration of these accounts
is missing from the liberal theorists’ treatment of pornography. It is as if
the person who is important in the case of pornography is not the worker
at all, but the person who benefits from her labor. The worker herself,
isolable rational agent or not, fades from view as if no pornography were
live-actor pornography at all, but mere representation.
somebody somewhere
Leaving aside pornography that does not involve real human bodies hav-
ing real sex, since that raises a host of different issues for both the critic
and the defender of pornography’s legitimacy,37 we are here faced with
prefer terms like “prostituted woman,” or “survivor.” (For a general overview of
the anti-prostitution objection to the term “sex worker” see Dorchen Leidholdt,
“Demand and the Debate,” a speech on trafficking and the history of the Coalition
Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), given on October 16, 2003. Available on
the CATW web site http://www.catwinternational.org. See also Janice Raymond,
“Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution,” in Prostitution, Trafficking and
Traumatic Stress, ed. Melissa Farley, 2003 (Binghamton: Haworth Press). Some
criticize the term “sex work” as erasing what sets prostitution apart, in a good
way, from regular “work”: the sense of the forbidden, the special nature of what
a prostitute does, even the very badness of it. And some point out that the term
has class connotations and affiliations that the term “prostitute” does not. I only
use the term “sex work” here when referring to the position of those for whom
it is the term of choice. Where I refer to those who criticize the sex industry as
being inherently exploitative and not involving legitimate “work,” I do not use
the term. After all, if somebody considers herself to have been a slave, then it is a
terrible thing to re-describe her as a worker—terrible both for slave and worker
alike.
36. For instance, see Nina Hartley, “In the Flesh: A Porn Star’s Journey” in
Whores and Other Feminists, op. cit., pp. 57–65 and generally, the work of Annie
Sprinkle, Susie Bright, and Theresa Reed.
37. In the case of pornography that does not involve the representation of
real humans having real sex, the critic tends to focus on the question of harm to
women generally. In this case, the issue becomes one of causation, the question
of whether such pornography leads to mistreatment, degradation, and abuse of
real people. For an excellent discussion of the various conceptions of causation
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the question of whether or not the disparate treatments of prostitution
and live-actor pornography are justifiable. In the one case, there is a fairly
direct exchange of sex for money (although the “worker” may not ever see
any of the money for her putative labor, in which case she is more prop-
erly classified a slave), while in the other case, the consumer’s purchase
is mediated by the camera. Both prostitution and live-actor pornography
may involve a third party (pimp or pornography producer) or neither
may (consider the pornographic work of Susie Bright, Annie Sprinkle,
Carol Leigh, and others who market their own work). The difference is
the different role the consumer plays in the transaction. In one case, the
consumer purchases sexual interaction with another person, and in the
other case, the consumer purchases the record of other persons’ sexual
interaction—a representation, as some would have it.
So it may not seem so strange after all that the feminist liberal treat-
ment of pornography involving real persons should look very different
from the feminist liberal treatment of prostitution: the consumer is en-
gaged in a different activity in each case. In the case of prostitution, what
is bought is—depending upon one’s point of view—a sexual service, access
to a body, or a person’s sexual self. In the case of live-actor pornography,
what is bought is a product, a record, a representation. What is of cen-
tral importance to the feminist liberal is not the fact of commodification
necessary for the making of this product, but its element of expression
and its connection to liberty interests in speech. Where the debate over
prostitution had been about whether or not sex was a proper candidate
for commodification, the expressive liberty defense of pornography’s le-
gitimacy proceeds as if commodification were necessary for the human
flourishing that it champions.
This presumption that commodification of sex is necessary for sexual
expression is itself problematic for several reasons. First, it is problematic
because nothing about the Millian/Aristotelian conception of identity as
partly socially structured and developed through exposure to varieties of
experience and choice requires that the market supply these experiences
and choices. Not without further argument anyway. It may be that a (rela-
tively) free market is the best way to ensure such variety, but then the case
would seem to be for actively promoting sexual commodification, not just
allowing us all to blossom in our own ways through unrestricted access
to ideas about differing sexual tastes and identities. And that argument
at work in such a view, see Anne W. Eaton, “Might Pornography Cause Harm?”
unpublished manuscript. On the liberal side, see Martha Nussbaum’s discussion
of literary pornography in “Objectification” in Sex and Social Justice, op. cit.,
pp. 213–40.
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simply is not made by the feminist liberal defenders of pornography’s le-
gitimacy, who assimilate live-actor pornography to speech and thereby
justify it.
None of what I have just argued is a direct argument against pornog-
raphy. For one thing, one could bite the bullet and argue in response
that what we need is more commodification of sex, not less—a position
that would probably trouble most liberals (let alone most feminist liber-
als). At the other end of the spectrum, one could accept that the modern
pornography industry has gotten beyond the obscenity models used to an-
alyze it, and agree that the sexual commodification involved in live-actor
pornography is potentially, or even actually, harmful and yet still think
that the harms of regulation are worse for the sort of human flourishing
reasons raised, as well as for more practical reasons of politics and legal
enforcement.38
Such arguments are commonly made about nonsexual matters, such
as the use of drugs, the practice of euthanasia, and (less frequently) abor-
tion. There is nothing incoherent about the view that some things that are
harmful should not be disallowed. Perhaps the products of the pornogra-
phy industry are like the products of the gun industry: weapons that can be
used to harm, but access to which is intimately connected to other values
we hold dear. According to such a view, we might consider various means
of minimizing the potential for harm caused by these products (through
restrictions like age limits, licensing, and trigger locks), but should also
try to preserve access where we can, in order to maximize liberty.39
This may sound like a solution to the problem of harmful pornography.
It is certainly appealing to this author’s liberal intuitions. But the elephant
in the room here is the fact that actual sex with real people—sexual labor
or subjugation, as the case may be—is being exchanged for money in the
case of commercial live-actor pornography. And this is the second problem
with the presumption that commodification of sex is necessary for sexual
expression. The product in such pornography depends upon a real per-
son’s having sex in exchange for somebody’s making money. The person
who is having sex in such a commercial context is thought to be of central
importance in feminist liberal thought about prostitution, but is seemingly
38. One example of the dangers of regulation that is often cited, accurately
or not, is the confiscation of Andrea Dworkin’s writings under the MacKinnon-
Dworkin anti-pornography regulations adopted in Canada.
39. This view, minus the connection to issues of gun control, is essentially the
one put forward in various versions by Cohen, Nussbaum, and other feminist
liberals who are concerned both about the status of women and about the value
of expressive liberty.
P1: FAW/SPH P2: FAW
SUPS010-18 SUPS010-Spector SUPS010-Spector-v1.cls April 7, 2006 18:25
438 Chapter Eighteen
irrelevant to feminist liberal thought about pornography. Academic dis-
cussions of expressive liberty typically center on the liberty interests of
consumers, or possibly producers, but seldom on the people whose bod-
ies are necessary to the making of pornography. This is not the case for
feminist critics of pornography of course. For instance, MacKinnon and
Dworkin famously argue that pornography is an arm of prostitution.40
But very few feminist liberals who write about pornography even mention
prostitution, and vice versa. Nussbaum is a notable exception here, but
even her work on the two subjects seemingly preserves the same split be-
tween conceptions of the self and subjects of focus that is found in the rest
of the feminist liberal discussion. The academic discussion of prostitution
centers on the autonomy of the individual worker whereas the academic
discussion of pornography centers on the value of expressive liberty, its
relation to obscenity, and the social development of sexual identity.
This dichotomy is not generally preserved in the writings of those with
practical experience working in or around the sex industry—whether they
write in critique or defense of it.41 A range of testimonials and social
studies reveals a more fluid industry than the academic and legal compart-
mentalizations of prostitution and pornography (as well as other forms of
sexual commerce) would seem to indicate. People who strip or perform in
pornographic movies are very often also prostitutes off-camera and vice
versa. Or they consider themselves such.42 According to one study of
40. See their work generally. Specifically, see Catharine MacKinnon and
Andrea Dworkin, 1998, In Harm’s Way (Cambridge: Harvard), and Catharine
MacKinnon, 1993, Only Words (Cambridge: Harvard).
41. See, generally, the discussions in Laurie Bell, ed., 1987, Good Girls/Bad
Girls: Sex Trade Workers and Feminists Face to Face (Toronto: Women’s Press);
Leidholdt and Raymond, eds., 1990, The Sexual Liberals and the Attack on Fem-
inism (New York: Pergamon); and Jill Nagle, ed., 1997, Whores and Other Femi-
nists (New York: Routledge), as well as the writings of Carol Leigh, Jill Leighton,
Theresa Reed, and many others.
42. See, for example, Traci Lords’s description in her recent autobiography of
work in the pornography industry and her attempts to leave it for work in the
mainstream movie industry: “We were scripted prostitutes, performing for the
camera.” See Traci Lord’s (2003) Underneath It All (New York: HarperCollins),
p. 192. Of course, many people do not work in more than one department of
the sex industry, but even those who testify to remaining on one side of a line
or the other tend to emphasize that, by doing so, they differ from their peers.
Tracy Quan often describes her work in prostitution as partly motivated by the
secrecy and sense of the forbidden around prostitution that is not the same in
the case of pornography. See Tracy Quan’s various writings, especially her novel
(2001), Diary of a Manhattan Call-Girl (New York: Crown). See also Lili Burana,
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prostitution, thirty-eight percent of the women surveyed reported being
used in child pornography.43 Some estimates of the percentage of strip-
pers involved in prostitution range from twenty-five to forty percent.44
According to reports available from various anti-prostitution organiza-
tions, stripping is often used as a pipeline into prostitution, and women
move, or are moved, between prostitution and pornography without re-
striction. In fact, many pro-prostitution activists decry the way the com-
mercial pornography industry has tried to distance itself from prostitution
in the public imagination in order to preserve its growing legitimacy, while
hypocritically employing prostitutes and promoting the prostitution of its
workers.
All of this stands in striking contrast to the academic feminist liberal
treatment of prostitution and pornography as raising different ethical
questions. The standard feminist liberal defense of prostitution’s legiti-
macy maintains that prostitution is often harmful and degrading, but that
we should work to eliminate the conditions that make women feel they
have to do it rather than penalize them for doing it. While, on the other
hand, the standard feminist liberal defense of the legitimacy of pornogra-
phy maintains that pornography is generally beneficial and we can try to
address its harms without curtailing the general practice, and so preserve
what is generally good about it.
The problem is that this defense does not attend to the way live-actor
pornography is produced and to the costs for those whose bodies are
2001, Strip City (New York: Talk Miramax Books); and Elizabeth Eaves, 2001,
Bare: On Women, Dancing, Sex, and Power (New York: Crown). Burana and
Eaves are part of recent spate of former workers chronicling their experiences at
the no-contact peep show establishment “The Lusty Lady.” Their accounts are
especially revealing here for the time they spend discussing the authors’ choices
not to engage in sexual contact for money. Linda Lee Tracey, 1997, Growing
Up Naked (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre), describes the affect the growth of
pornography had on the world of stripping during the 1970s. She is avowedly
a former stripper, not a pornography worker or prostitute, but discusses how
this contrasted with the behavior of many of her stripper peers who exchanged
direct sexual contact for money. Tracey was also the subject of the controversial
National Film Board of Canada documentary about pornography, “Not A Love
Story.”
43. Silbert and Pines, 1984, “Pornography and the Sexual Abuse of Women,”
Sex Roles 10, discussed in Margaret A. Baldwin (Spring 1989) “Pornography and
The Traffic in Women,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1:1, pp. 111–55.
44. “Prostitution in Hartford,” research compiled by Michele Kelly under the
supervision of this author as part of an ongoing research project partially funded
by the Hartford Metropolitan Research Program at Trinity College.
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necessary for making it. As a thought experiment that should help illus-
trate what is wrong here, consider the following: a liberal defense of the
legitimacy of prostitution based solely on the benefits prostitution has for
the consumer, without any discussion of the role of the service provider.
According to such an account, the legitimate sale of sex would be a good
thing because it would aid “the rest of us” in our sexual development
and exploration of our identities. Even nasty, harmful prostitution
exchanges where prostitutes are abused could help teach us what we like
or don’t like, and traditionally marginalized sexual groups (such as sado-
masochists) could find an outlet for sexual desires that might otherwise
find improper outlet in the real (noncommercial) world of personal rela-
tionships. By enforcing other laws that are more narrowly targeted, such
as those against kidnapping and underage sex, we could still weed out
the forms of prostitution that are truly unacceptable, without preventing
a person from exercising autonomy in deciding what to buy—which
in a capitalist system, is central to human flourishing and the good
life.45 Although some prostitution may be unpleasant for the worker, the
costs, for the sexual expressiveness of society at large, of limiting the prac-
tice would be too great to regulate it. So we should instead tolerate the
bad and celebrate its value in helping consumers learn about their sexual
identities.
Such an account would seem anathema to the broadest feminist con-
cerns with the status of women and the conditions of the lives of the un-
derprivileged because it leaves out a crucial element: the putative workers
who may be trafficked or otherwise have so few options as to be un-
free. (Neither would such an account satisfy pro-prostitution activists
concerned with improving working conditions for those who choose to
exchange their sexual labor for money, because such activists typically
have, well, a worker in view.) It also treats prostitution as generally a good
thing, in contrast with the standard feminist liberal treatment of prosti-
tution, which either concedes to the critic that most forms of prostitution
are troubling as practiced—arguing that they are just made worse through
stigmatization and criminalization—or which refuses to essentialize the
45. This thought experiment is offered somewhat tongue-in-check of course.
But similar defenses can be found in the literature. Ericsson and Califia, for in-
stance, both defend the legitimacy of prostitution largely through such accounts
of the benefits it offers to the consumer. See Lars O. Ericsson, April 1980, “What’s
Wrong with Prostitution?” Ethics 90:3, pp. 335–66; and Pat Califia, “Whoring in
Utopia,” op. cit. Schwarzenbach also offers a brief argument in this vein. See Sibyl
Schwarzenbach, “Contractarians and Feminists Debate Prostitution,” op. cit.
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activity in any way at all. Even those feminists sensitive to queer theory,
who recognize the value of nonheteronormative expressions of sexuality,
would likely shy away from an argument that completely ignores all costs
to the worker in such commercial transactions.
The problem is how to maintain a concern with individual women and
the conditions of their lives, while not making the classical mistake of
ignoring the effect that social practice has on a person’s self-conception
and very ability to make autonomous choices. This is an old problem for
feminism, but it is at its sharpest in the different ways that prostitution and
pornography are treated in academic discussion. It is here that feminist
liberalism must come to grips with the tensions in its treatment of women
as individuals and as a group, and with its traditional interest in the
welfare of the “rest of us” that overshadows interest in bettering the lives
of women who are the most marginalized.
I am not arguing that feminist liberalism lacks the tools to analyze
prostitution or live-actor pornography, but rather that (1) different tools
are being used to analyze each, undercutting the credibility and useful-
ness of both analyses, and (2) in defending the legitimacy of pornography,
feminist liberalism is using the wrong tools. Using obscenity law to in-
terpret live-actor pornography is not adequate for addressing concerns
about the welfare of persons who are involved in the making of live-actor
pornography. And privileging the interests of consumers to the exclusion
of all else flies in the face of the values of both feminism and liberalism.
At the same time, feminist liberal analyses of prostitution tend toward
the simplistic when assessing individual choice and consent, simultane-
ously emphasizing the damaging effects of stigmatization and treating the
individual’s choice to exchange sex for money as problematic only in so
far as it results from economic coercion. That is, only in so far as it is a
symptom of poverty.
Feminist liberalism needs to do two things to remedy the troubling dis-
parity between its treatment of prostitution and its treatment of pornog-
raphy. It needs to be more critical of the meaningfulness of consent and
choice in prostitution, given the social context. It should also combine the
concern for the worker that is central to the defense of prostitution, with
sensitivity to the social and cultural embeddedness of self that is central to
the defense of pornography. Then it can look at live-actor pornography as
a form of prostitution that raises additional questions about third-party
consumption.
So first, what is needed is attention to the labor in live-actor pornog-
raphy, rather than a concern, to the exclusion of all else, for the con-
sumer. Examining the context for pornography workers rather than just
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consumers will present some difficulties. For instance, consent may be
more meaningful for some persons and in some instances. Nevertheless,
the point is to assess and justify consent, not the consumer’s purchase
right. We already do not permit consent to mutual combat with the idea
that such “consent” is not rational. Apparent exceptions are more ap-
parent than real, because they are highly regulated in a way that pornog-
raphy is not, as in the case of boxing.46 Even such apparent exceptions
may be disappearing in the United States. Courts do not ask whether two
hockey players consent to mutual combat when they throw off their gloves
and fight. So-called “no holds barred” competitive combat, such as the
Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), has been outlawed in many
states. The big venue for Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) is now Japan, not the
United States. Indeed, it seems that commercial live-actor pornography
stands alone as a legally legitimate industry where interest in consumer
access obviates concerns about the worker/participant.47
Traditional feminist liberal interest in preserving individual women’s
autonomy must be combined with a sensitivity to the fact that more op-
tions for some can sometimes mean less freedom for others.48 Pornogra-
phy that uses real people having real sex requires a supply of prostitutes
to produce the product. That is something that feminist liberal defenders
of the empowering potential of pornography for “the rest of us” need to
take into account. We can recognize that persons are not isolable objects
whose scope of choice is analyzable apart from social context, without
losing sight of those who are least well-off and have the most to lose from
46. The recent epidemic of HIV/AIDs within the mainstream commercial
pornography industry has brought some attention to the lack of regulations
governing it. But even this concern is expressed more as a concern over public
health issues than a specific concern for workers within the pornography indus-
try.
47. Readers might consider the recent television “reality” shows about boxing.
As attractive or repulsive (or both) as they may be, it is interesting to note that these
shows have (so far, anyway) focused on the perspective of the boxing hopefuls
rather than on the perspectives of promoters or audience.
48. For an excellent, detailed analysis of how sexual autonomy might be hin-
dered by the normalization of prostitution, see Scott Anderson “Prostitution and
Sexual Autonomy: Making Sense of the Prohibition of Prostitution,” op. cit. Al-
though Anderson’s focus is solely on prostitution (indeed, preserving the same
distinction between prostitution and pornography that I identify in much of the
feminist liberal literature), I think his analysis of the ways in which prohibitions
can preserve one’s sexual autonomy can, in fact, also be applied to pornography.
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the further commodification of the sexual sphere that evidently goes along
with an increase in avenues for sexual expression.
Second, what is needed is for feminist liberalism to bring the same
sensitivity to the social and cultural embeddedness of self that is central to
its pornography analysis, to the concern for the worker that is the subject
of its prostitution analysis. Combined with a more socially embedded
view of the self, the feminist liberal argument about the harms done by
stigmatization would then be made stronger. If the self is partly socially
structured, and our identities are built in the context of exposure to a
variety of experiences and expressions of sexuality, etc., then true freedom
of choice and self-determination are near impossible when an entire sphere
of activity (commercial sex) is so publicly stigmatized. Our very ability to
develop and flourish is stunted by the opprobrium heaped on anyone who
expresses his or her sexual self commercially. And it is the least well off
who often suffer the most from such stigmatizations because they start
out at a disadvantage.
We have these discussions about the tensions between freedom and
protection all the time in other arenas, when debating the ethics and
practicality of regulating “hate speech” and certain forms of group ha-
rassment, and remedies like affirmative action. It is not easy. But in other
arenas aside from the sexual one, there does not seem to be such a striking
bifurcation of thought for liberals between concern for the worker and
concern for the consumer. The very different ways pornography and pros-
titution are viewed in our culture reveal something deeper about the way
our culture views persons: the boundaries of persons, the proper func-
tioning of persons, and the appropriate activity of persons. Sex seems to
be the place where all these come together for us.
One option open to the feminist liberal is to offer a defense of pornog-
raphy’s legitimacy that combines the expressive liberty argument with
an argument that workers do meaningfully choose to participate in such
an enterprise commercially. The question then becomes one of whether
having the “option” to exchange sex for money is more like having the
option to sell one’s (even nonessential) bodily organs, or more like having
the option to be a ballet dancer, professional basketball player, or paid
subject for medical experiments. As a society, we have decided that the
former is not acceptable because it puts what are deemed undue incen-
tives/economic pressures on the least well off. But we have apparently
decided that the incentives/economic pressure on poor kids to try to excel
at sports rather than academics is acceptable. If we decide that selling sex
is more like organ selling, then we have decided that sex is an essential
part of human identity, or a unique sort of activity in some way. If we
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decide that selling sex is more like being a professional athlete, then we
have decided that, for the purposes of public morality, sex should not be
cordoned off as a special sphere of human activity with a wholly different
set of public rules than other physical activity/labor.
I do not believe that these issues need be cast in terms of a theoreti-
cal versus practical interest, as many critics of the sex industry charge.49
Indeed, what I offer is a theoretical critique with practical consequences.
What I identify as a theoretical disparity between feminist liberal treat-
ments of prostitution and pornography means that the feminist liberal is
not answering the charges against the two brought by the radical critic,
and so not addressing the critic’s practical concerns.
This is important if we ever do hope to resolve any of the disputes
between feminist critics and defenders of the legitimacy of the sex in-
dustry. For if the critic keeps asking about the welfare of the worker,
and the defender keeps answering with an argument about the benefits of
pornography for “the rest of us,” we will get nowhere. I remain hopeful
that we can indeed get somewhere, and actually help improve the lives
of those persons who are the subjects of feminist concern, while preserv-
ing the value of free expression and, yes, even the classical Millian value
of varieties of experience. This will not be easy, for it means getting our
hands dirty with some very tough philosophical and more globally moral
questions: about what pornography is and what it does, what the signif-
icance is of real live bodies to pornography’s function, and finally, what
we want to say about the degree to which sex and sexuality are essential
to the kinds of creatures we are.
I think, although I cannot argue the case here, that selling sex is neither
like selling one’s organs nor like being a professional athlete. My own view
is that it is more like the case of the subject paid for medical experiments:
it can be acceptable, depending on context, but it can also be unacceptable
and especially harmful, depending on context, despite the participants all
apparently freely choosing to be involved. In the current landscape of
feminist liberal discussions about the sex industry, there is no room for
such a view. That’s the point.
49. For instance, see Margaret A. Baldwin, “Split at the Root: Prostitution
and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform,” op. cit.; or Vednita Carter and Evelina
Giobbe, Winter 1999, “Duet: Prostitution, Racism, and Feminist Discourse,”
Hastings Women’s Law Journal, 10:1, pp. 37–57.
